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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CmmnqAL PRoCEDUEE-PAII
ST OF PAROLEES: WASmNGTON LEcISLAfT= STANDA mS AND CONSTrUTONA.L CoNswEEArIoNs-Ch. 98,

Wash. Laws of 1968.
During its 1969 Regular Session the Washington Legislature enacted
legislation governing parole revocation hearings' and re-enacted existing provisions concerning the arrest and initial detention of suspected
parole violators.2 The re-enacted portion of the statute provides that
any parole or probation officer may arrest a parolee without a warrant
when he has "reason to believe" that a convicted person has violated
any state statute or a condition of his parole.3 The prisoner is not to
be released until the board acts to reinstate his parole status.4
Neither the legislature nor the courts has clarified the meaning of
the requirement that the arresting officer have "reason to believe" that
a parolee has violated a statute or a condition of his parole. By way of
dictum, however, the Washington Supreme Court has said "[W] e can
find no constitutional infirmity in the statutory provisions authorizing
the initial arrest and detention ... ."I The court's willingness to entertain constitutional questions concerning parole revocation at the rearrest stage suggests a departure from the traditional view of parole
revocation as a statutory procedure to which constitutional considerations are only marginally applicable.0 This note contends that a reexamination of conventional parole revocation doctrine compels the
conclusion that due process considerations are applicable at the rearrest stage, and that these considerations require that "reason to
believe" be interpreted to require "probable cause" to arrest the suspected parole violator.
1. Ch. 98, §§ 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 [1969] Wash. Sess. Laws; WAsH. Rmv. CoDE §§ 9.95.120,
.122, .123, .124, .125 (1969).
2. Ch. 98, § 2 [1969] Wash. Sess. Laws; WAsH. REv. CoDE § 9.95.120 (1969).
3. Id. The period of initial detention during which the parolee is held without bail
may extend to forty-five days, for the parolee must be served with a copy of the
factual allegations of his parole violation within fifteen days of his arrest and he is

entitled to a hearing within thirty days of this time.
4.

Id.

5. Bailey v. Gallagher, 75 Wn. 2d 260, 266, 450 P.2d 802, 805 (1969).
6. See, e.g., Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
957 (1963); Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Washington v. Hagan,
287 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1961).
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TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF PAROLE STATUS

At least three theories have been offered to support the conclusion
that parole revocation is governed solely by statutory provisions. The
first of these has been labelled the "contract theory." 7 Stated simply,
the argument is that the prisoner, by accepting a grant of conditional
liberty, has agreed to the revocation procedures authorized by the
legislature. The parolee is said to have waived whatever due process
rights he may have had by consenting to the statutory conditions of
8
release.
However, the contract theory was rejected by the Supreme Court
as early as 1932 when the court referred to probation as a "matter
of favor, not of contract."9 On a practical level, a prisoner faced with
the alternative of imprisonment will probably "accept" any conditions
that are imposed. Such an arrangement smacks of unequal bargaining
power and is hardly a "contract between equals."'"
A second theory sees the parole status as "constructive custody.""
A revocation of this status is not considered a taking of liberty but
merely a change from "constructive" to actual custody.' 2 It follows
that the re-taking of a suspected parole violator is not an "arrest" in
the conventional sense and that the safeguards required in the case
of an actual arrest need not be afforded the prisoner.' 3
Equating actual and constructive custody seems unrealistic. While

7. Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE L. REv.
638, 645 (1966); see also Comment, Parole; A Critique of its Legal Foundations and
Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 703, 708 (1963).
8. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 444 P.2d 236 (Okla. Crim. 1968); Fuller v. State,
122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1899).
In Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 100 (6th Cir. 1968), Justice Celebrezze, dissenting,
inconsistently mixed two theories of parole status in tacitly recognizing due process
rights which had been waived, and supporting the analysis by referring to parole as
a "privilege" which thereby forecloses consideration of constitutional rights.
9. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
10. Comment, Due Process and the Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE
L. REv. 638, 645-46 (1966).
11. Robinson v. Cox, 77 N.M. 55, 419 P.2d 253 (1966); In re Varner, 166 Ohio St.
340, 142 N.E.2d 846 (1957); Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional
Liberty, 12 WAYNE L. Rgv. 638, 646 (1966).

12.

Ex parte Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952); McCoy v. Harris, 108

Utah 407, 408, 160 P.2d 721, 722 (1945).
374 P.2d 353 (1962).

But cf., Schooley v. Wilson, 150 Col. 483,

13. United States v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); People v. Villareal,
262 Cal. App. 2d 438, 68 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1968) ; People v. Contreras, 263 Cal. App. 2d
281, 69 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1968); People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 297 P.2d 451

(1956).
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the parolee is inhibited somewhat by the conditions of his parole,
which commonly include restrictions on association and travel,14 it
cannot be seriously contended that these restrictions are comparable
to the restrictions imposed upon an actual prisoner. The Colorado
Supreme Court recognized this distinction between actual and constructive custody and held:15
When one entitled to his liberty, even though in constructive
custody of the state, is actually imprisoned, his imprisonment
becomes more onerous than the law allows. Under such circumstances he may resort to the remedy of habeas corpus and is
entitled to be released from physical confinement and restored
to constructive custody.
The third theory argues that parole is a mere privilege, 6 and hence,
as a gratuity, is revocable at the whim of the grantor.' Because
parole is not constitutionally compelled, but exists only as a result
of the benevolence of the state,' the parolee is considered a "creature
of grace" having gained his limited'freedom as a matter of privilege
and not of right."
The "privilege-right" distinction as applied to the status of con20
impetus in Esco v. Zerbst
ditional liberty, received its greatest
21
where Justice Cardozo emphasized:
14. For a discussion of common conditions of probation, see Best & Birzon, Conditions of Probation; An Analysis, 57 GEo. L. Rzv. 809 (1963).
15. Schooley v. Wilson, 150 Col. 483, 374 P.2d 353, 355 (1962). Accord, United
States v. O'Donovan, 107 F. Supp. 347, 350 (N.D. III. 1952) where the court said:
[Sluch parole rightfully merited and earned under the statute invests in the
parolee a status or right which he has the right to defend by due process in a
court of law. In such a case where it is alleged the parole termination was unlaw-

ful, the court is required to inquire into the legality of detention.
16. See, e.g., Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91
(6th Cir. 1968); Kirsch v. United States, 173 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1949); Riggins v. Rhay,
75 Wn. 2d 271, 450 P.2d 806 (1969); See also Comment, Due Process and Revocation
of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE L. Rav. 638 (1966).
17. Mahan v. Buchanan, 310 Ky. 832, 221 S.W.2d 945 (1949); State ex rel. McQueen
v. Horton, 31 Ala. App. 71, 14 So.2d 557, aff'd, 244 Ala. 594, 14 So.2d 561 (1943);
Vigil v. Hughes, 24 N.M. 640, 175 Pac. 713 (1918). See also Comment, Constitutional
Law: Parole Status and the Privilege Concept, 1969 Dunx L.J. 139, 140 (1969).
18. See, e.g., Riggins v. IRhay, 75 Wn. 2d 271, 450 P.2d 806 (1969); Hiatt v. Compagna,
178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949); Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946). See generally Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE L.
Rav. 638, 643-45 (1966).
19. United States v. Frederick, 405 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1968); Marchand v. United
States Probation Office, 296 F. Supp. 532 (D. Mass. 1969); Hiatt v. Compagna, 178
F.2d 42, 45 (5th Cir. 1949); Kirsch v. United States, 173 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1949).
20. 295 US. 490 (1935).
21. Id. at 492, 493.
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We do not accept petitioner's contention that the privilege has
a basis in the constitution, apart from any statute. Probation or
suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted
of a crime, and may be coupled with such conditions in respect
of its duration as Congress may impose.
Although a few states have held that a parolee has a vested right to
his conditional liberty until he violates the conditions of his parole, 2
and while at least one court has disavowed the "privilege-right" distinction altogether,23 the majority have adopted Cardozo's analysis of
conditional liberty as a mere privilege and thus not protected by due
process.24
While the "privilege-right" distinction seems well entrenched in
legal doctrine, recent Supreme Court decisions in non-parole cases
indicate that the assumptions upon which it rests may be unsound."
Mere denomination of an interest as a privilege or right is no longer
determinative of the individual's procedural rights that protect that
interest. 26 Reliance on the "privilege-right" distinction has given away
to a process whereby the court balances the state's need to dispense
with certain procedural safeguards against the detriment to the individual that may result from the denial of those safeguards."

22. See, e.g., Lester v. Foster, 207 Ga. 596, 63 S.E.2d 402 (1951) ; State v. Zolantakis,
70 Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044 (1927) (suspended sentence); Ex parte Lucero, 23 N.M.
433, 168 Pac. 713 (1917) (same).
23. Joyce v. Strassheim, 242 Ill. 359, 90 N.E. 118 (1909).
24. Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE L. REV.
638, 644 (1966); Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1074 (1953).
25. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). In Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 894 (1961), '"[tjhe easy assertion that because she had no constitutional right
to be there in the first place, she was not deprived of liberty or property by the superintendent's action" was found not to be dispositive of a defense worker's claim that she
had been denied procedural due process when she was summarily dismissed from employment.
26. In Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 178 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) the
court said:
Whether the interest involved be a right or a privilege, the fact remains that it is
an interest of almost incalculable value . . . Private interests are to be evaluated
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and not in terms of
labels or fictions but in terms of their true significance and worth.
See also Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 368
U.S. 930 (1961).
27. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956) ; Cafeteria Workers Local
473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, 3. concurring). See generally Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv.
L. REv. 1439 (1968).
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II. DUE PROCESS FOR PAROLEE RE-ARREST
It appears, then, that the traditional analyses of parole revocation,
denying the applicability of due process, are not persuasive.28 Without
any convincing rationale for placing parole revocation procedure outside the ambit of constitutional protection, it follows that here, as in
other state-individual confrontations, due process imposes limitations
on official conduct. Just as the state cannot subject a juvenile to the
possibility of incarceration without assuring him due process, 29 it
cannot act to deprive the parolee of his liberty without assuring the
proper measure of due process. The question, then, becomes what
does due process entail in the parolee re-arrest situation.
Due process conditions state action by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court has long struggled with the concept
of fourteenth amendent due process but has reached no unanimity.3 0
Yet, since Mapp v. Ohio,"1 it has been clear that fourteenth amendment due process incorporates the fourth amendment guarantees
against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, lower courts
have held that the re-arrest of a parolee is not a seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment 3 2 Such holdings seem to be based
upon the rationale of constructive custody. If, as urged above,"3 this
concept is an inadequate justification for viewing parole revocation as
entirely beyond the reach of fourteenth amendment due process, it
seems equally non-persuasive as a rationale for holding that due process requires anything less than those safeguards necessitated by the
fourth amendment. Just what the fourth amendment requires in the
re-arrest context remains to be considered.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the fourth amendment protects against all unreasonable official invasions of individual liberty

28. But see Riggins v. Rhay, 75 Wn.2d 271, 450 P.2d 806 (1969) (rejecting application
of fifth and sixth amendment safeguards and reaffirming that parole revocation procedures
are governed only by statute).
29. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 n.7 (1967) (reserving issue of propriety of arrest).
30. See Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" In the Fourth Amendment, 73 YA= LJ.
74 (1963).
31. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
32. See, e.g., People v. Contreras, 263 Cal. App. 2d 281, 69 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1968);
People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, (1965); People v. Denne,
141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 297 P. 2d 451 (1956).
33. See notes 11-15 and accompanying text, supra.
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even if the invasion might be described as limited. 4 The parolee rearrest problem presents a slightly different question because here the
parolee's liberty is itself limited. Nevertheless, by analogy to the
cases rejecting the "privilege-right" dichotomy, 5 the parolee should
be viewed as having an interest in his liberty, even though that liberty
is limited or conditional. The determination of reasonableness under
the fourth amendment is basically a process of seeking an accommodation between state and individual interests brought into conflict by
official procedure. The content of due process in the parolee re-arrest
setting, therefore, must ultimately be the product of a balancing
process 3a-a weighing of the state's interest in protecting its citizens
by re-arresting parolees for alleged violations of state law or parole
conditions against the individual's interest in protection against unjustifiable seizure.
Clearly an arrest will work a hardship upon the parolee. His liberty
is at stake as well as any reputation he may have regained within
his community. 7 Even if the re-arrest is later revealed to be unjustified, the stigma may remain with him. Furthermore, the Washington
statute allows for detention of up to forty-five days prior to a hearing,3 8 a time sufficient to work a great hardship upon a parolee
whose financial and employment security may depend upon continued
freedom.
The state's primary interest in re-arresting a person suspected of
parole violations is protection of society from a convict who no longer
merits freedom from penal confinement. 9 If procedures can be developed which offer significant protection to the parolee when re-

34. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
35. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text, supra.
36. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967); Terry v. Ohio 392
U.S. 1 (1968). See Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment,
1960 SUPRE_%IE COURT REv. 46, 63; cf. Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 433, 448-49 (1967); LaFave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MicH.
L. REV. 40, 57 (1968). See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183-84 (1949)
where Mr. Justice Jackson in dissent seems to balance fourth amendment rights against
the state's interest in protecting its citizenry, in his discussion of a hypothetical concerning a kidnapped child.
37. See Note, Constitutional Law: Parole Status and the Privilege Concept, 1969
DUKE L.J. 139, 146 (1969).
38. See note 3 and accompanying text, supra.
39. Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE L. REV.
638, 649 (1966).
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arrested without subordinating the state's interest in crime prevention,
utilization of the balancing test would indicate that such procedures
should be followed. Moreover, it can be argued that it is in the state's
interest to treat the individual fairly at all critical stages of parole
revocation.4 ° The purpose of parole is primarily that of rehabilitation
or reformation of the convicted person,4" and unfair or unnecessarily
harsh treatment, leading to the likelihood of even greater alienation
and antagonism on the part of the parolee, can only work to defeat
the basic purposes of the parole system itself.4 2
The objective, then, would appear to be to assure the integrity of
the re-arrest to the greatest extent possible while protecting the public
interest in crime prevention. The fourth amendment's requirement of
probable cause would meet this objective.4 3 The requirement of probable cause to believe a statute or parole condition has been violated
prior to re-arrest would protect the parolee from being returned
to jail on mere suspicion but the efficiency of the state's operations
would be little affected by the standard. Because probable cause can
be based on hearsay or informers' tips, 44 a requirement of a showing
of probable cause would not necessitate greater time in the field on
the part of the parole officers.40 Informers would be protected by the
40. In Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 243-44 (D.C. Cir. 1963) Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger listed three stages as especially crucial; the initial decision to use a warrant,
the actual arrest and a preliminary interview with the parolee.
41. See Bates, Probation and Parole as Elements in Crime Prevention, 1 LAW & CoNrssoRaRY PROBLMS 484 (1934); Comment, The Rights of the Probationer; A Legal
Limbo, 28 U. or Prrr. L. REv. 643 (1967).
42. Justice Hamilton utilized similar reasoning in his dissent in Mempa v. Rhay, 68
Wn.2d 882, 900, 416 P.2d 104, 114 (1966). He wrote: "[the threat of arbitrary or
whimsical commitment does not tend to encourage either co-operation or successful rehabilitation. Reformation can best be accomplished by fair, consistent, and straight-forward treatment of the individual." See also Comment, The Rights of the Probationer;
A Legal Limbo, 28 U. Prrr. L. Ry. 643 (1966-67).
43. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 176 (1949) the Supreme Court
stated:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The
standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved ...
... The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the
best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests....
44. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
45. Parole officers in Washington are already overworked. In 1963, the field staff was
described as. "inadequate, quantitatively, in most areas to perform the.kind of--1parole
supervision that the public has the right to expect." THm STATE OF WASHnGToN BoAam
Or PRISON TERmas am PAROLES AND FELD SEnvicas; A SuRva= BY T NATioNAn CouNci.
oiq Cami Aim DEQuENCY § 3.09 (1964).
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privilege against disclosure," and thus be able to continue their work
without loss of their "cover."
In sum, the balancing of interests test of constitutionality favors
the application of a probable cause standard for the re-arrest of a
parolee.4 7 Yet, even if probable cause is not a constitutionally required
meaning of the "reason to believe" language in the Washington parole
revocation statute, that meaning could still be ascribed by a process
of statutory interpretation. The test for the existence of probable
cause has been formulated as follows:48
[W] ould the fact available to the officer at the moment of seizure
or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief"
that the action was appropriate.
The essence of this formulation is that the officer must have reason
(reasonable grounds) to believe that a violation has been committed.49
Support for interpreting "reason to believe" as equivalent to probable
cause is found in the second draft of the Model Penal Code which
cites the Washington statute as offering general support for the Code's
requirement of probable cause to affect the re-arrest of a parolee without a warrant."°
III. PROCEDURE FOR TESTING THE RE-ARREST
If it be established that a probable cause standard is appropriate
for the re-arrest of a parolee in Washington, a problem remains under
46. The identity of the informer upon whose information the arresting officer relies
to establish probable cause for arrest need not be disclosed. If, however, the identity of
the informer is necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence the privilege
against disclosure will not be invoked. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61
(1957).
47. It is conceivable that the result of balancing interests in the re-arrest context
might produce a probable cause standard less rigorous than that applied to arrests generally. Consider Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), where the Court
applied a watered-down probable cause test. There probable cause to conduct an administrative search of a particular dwelling was held to be satisfied by a finding of
probable cause with respect to the area in which the dwelling is located.
48. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). See also Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307, 313 (1959), in which probable cause was held to exist where:
facts and circumstances within [the arresting officer's] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.
49. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.3, comment 1, at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
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the state statute concerning the time a parolee may have to wait before
the propriety of his re-arrest is officially determined. As previously
pointed out, the period of detention prior to a hearing may be as long
as 45 days. 1 Such a prolonged detention period is an obvious injustice to a man improperly detained. Under the federal parole procedure,5 2 a preliminary interview must be held in the district of the
arrest as soon after the arrest as possible to appraise the parolee of
the charges against him and the circumstances surrounding his alleged
violation. Such an early interview might also be suitable for the additional purpose of making an appraisal of the legality of a re-arrest
under the probable cause standard. No compelling state interest appears for delaying this determination and the countervailing interest
of the individual in the shortest possible period of improper detention
is clear 5 The Washington scheme would be substantially improved
by the addition of an early hearing requirement.
Under the Washington statute as it presently stands, the parolee's
best remedy, if arrested and detained upon a showing of less than
probable cause, would seem to be the writ of habeas corpus. Both the
state and federal courts have held that the writ will lie to challenge
the parolee's detention after re-arrest 4 Additional methods of controlling the behavior of parole officers may be developed if necessary.
Possibilities include excluding from revocation proceedings evidence
garnered incident to an illegal arrest,55 as well as internal safeguards,
such as parole board sanctions for misconduct on the part of parole
officers.5 5
51. See note 3, supra.
52. 28 C.F.R. § 2.40 (1970). See also United States v. Kenton, 262 F. Supp. 205 (D.
Conn. 1967).
53. See note 35 and accompanying text, supra.
54. At the state level see Johnson v. Stucker, 203 Kan. 258, 453 P.2d 35 (1969);
Schooley v. Wilson, 150 CoL 483, 374 P.2d 353 (1962). For federal cases holding habeas

corpus will lie if a parolee is detained for an "unreasonable" duration without a hearing
after his re-arrest see U.S. ex rel. Vance v. Kenton, 252 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1966);
U.S. ex rel. Buono v. Kenton, 287 F.2d. 534 (2d. Cir. 1961).
55. The rule envisioned would be similar in operation to the exclusionary rule utilized in fourth amendment search and seizure cases. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).

56. Mr. Justice Finley of the Washington Supreme Court has suggested that alternative methods of controlling police behavior be developed. He argues that the exclusionary
rule is undesirable because in the words of Justice Cardozo in People v. Defore, 242
N.Y. 13, 16, 150 N.E. 585, 588 (1926), "[tlhe privacy of the home has been infringed,
and the murderer goes free." Justice Finley proposes that civil remedies such as actions
for false arrest and trespass as well as the court's general contempt power be utilized
to control governmental action. Finley, Who is on Trial--The Police? The Courts? Or
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IV. CONCLUSION
It seems clear that the fictions and theories used to support the
argument that the sole depository of the parolee's rights is the parole
revocation statute are inadequate. The state, the parolee, and society
all have an interest in assuring the integrity of the parolee's re-arrest.
After a weighing of these interests, interpretation of "reason to believe" in the existing statute as requiring less than probable cause
for re-arrest could render this provision of the Washington statute
unconstitutional. On the other hand, if "reason to believe" is interpreted as requiring probable cause, the interests of the state, of the
parolee, and of society can be reconciled and the requirements of due
process will clearly be met.

the Criminally Accused, 57 J. CRI1. L. C. & P. S. 379 (1966) ; see also Justice Finley's
concurrence in State v. Rosseau, 40 Wn. 2d 92, 241 P.2d 447 (1952).
Possible use of the court's contempt power is explored is Bloomrosen, Contempt of
Court and Unlawful Police Action, 11 RUTGERS L. REV. 526 (1957). See also 8 J. WIcvMORE, EVIDENCE (McNaughton rev. 1961) § 2184a, at 31 n.1.

184

